Бесплатный фрагмент - Special services of North Korea

Part I. THE DRAGON’S SHIELD: Ministry of State Security (MGB) — The Regime’s Keeper

Chapter 1. Birth of the Punitive Apparatus: From Soviet Advisors to the Creation of the MGB under Kim Il Sung

The dust of World War II had not yet settled when a new, special war began in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula — the war of the state against its own people. In the autumn of 1945, Pyongyang lay in ruins, and in these ruins, to the accompaniment of the clanking tracks of Soviet tanks, other soldiers began their work — soldiers of the invisible front. They arrived without fanfare, in worn-out tunics and civilian coats, with briefcases stuffed not with money, but with instructions on how to build the perfect machine of terror.

These were NKVD officers. Their mission was clear: to create a repressive apparatus from scratch, absolutely loyal to the pro-Soviet leadership. Speed and efficiency were paramount. By February 1946, under the direct supervision of NKVD Colonel I.F., the Bureau of Public Security (BPS — “Bureau of Security”) had been formed. This was a euphemism, behind which hid the future Gestapo of Kim Il Sung.

The BPS was not a simple police force. Its structure copied that of its Soviet big brother with frightening accuracy:

— The Investigative Department was engaged in “identifying counter-revolutionary elements.”

— The Public Order Department monitored the mood on the streets, which were increasingly becoming gray and deserted with the onset of curfew.

— The Government Guard Department snapped to attention, protecting the top leadership, among whom the name of Red Army Major Kim Il Sung was being heard more and more loudly.

But the real heart of the future monster was the Department for Combating Counter-Revolution and Espionage. Its investigators, who had taken accelerated courses at NKVD training centers in Khabarovsk and Moscow, did not stand on ceremony. Their tools were night arrests, torture by cold and hunger, sleep deprivation, and humiliation. The first camps, bearing dry names like “Correctional Labor Point No. 7,” began accepting “contingents” as early as 1946. Prisoners — former Japanese collaborators, South Korean “spies,” Christian pastors — disappeared into them without a trace.

Kim Il Sung, observing this work, felt no disgust. He saw the genius simplicity of the system. His trusted people, like the future Minister of State Security Pang Hak-se, were embedded in the BPS not to learn, but to adopt. They saw how the Soviet curators created a web of informants, how they broke wills, how they turned fear into currency. And they understood: this instrument must serve not Moscow, but one single person.

By 1948, when the DPRK was proclaimed, the Bureau was ready for transformation. The Soviet advisors, having done their rough work, began to gradually fade into the shadows. They left behind not a state, but a well-oiled mechanism of repression. The framework of the future Ministry of State Security was cast from steel supplied from Lubyanka, and was ready to be stamped with a new brand — the brand of the Kim dynasty.

September 9, 1948. The echo of official speeches reverberates over Pyongyang. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is proclaimed. In the shadows of the ceremonial portraits of Kim Il Sung, whispers already circulate about a new agency — the Ministry of State Security (MGB). The Bureau of Public Security had done its rough work. Now it was to become the regime’s main sword and shield.

This sword first struck at its own. The “purges” began. The goal was to eliminate any possible competition. The first to fall under the knife were:

— Former comrades from the anti-Japanese struggle — those who knew Kim Il Sung as “just a brigade commander,” not the “Great Leader.”

— Factionalists — members of the pro-Soviet “Yan’an faction” and the pro-Chinese grouping. They were accused of “servility to great powers.”

— Religious figures — a relic of the feudal past, incompatible with the new quasi-religion of Juche.

The MGB’s interrogation rooms operated around the clock. Interrogations were conducted using “special methods” — beatings, sleep deprivation torture, needles under fingernails. Confessions, extracted by force, were identical: “spy of the South Korean dictator,” “agent of American imperialism.”

Public trials became a theater of the absurd. The accused, often with traces of beatings on their faces, repented for crimes they had not committed. Then — a short pause, and the verdict: execution or life imprisonment in the camps that were now multiplying throughout the country.

By the end of the 1940s, the MGB was no longer a simple imitation of the NKVD. It had developed its own handwriting:

— A system of “guilt by association” — punishing the entire family for the “crime” of one of its members.

— A network of “informants” (yonbojan), entangling all neighborhoods, villages, factories, and institutions. Informing became a civic virtue.

— Ideological control — the MGB monitored not only actions, but also thoughts.

By 1950, at the start of the Korean War, the MGB had become the perfect instrument of absolute power. It was omnipresent, merciless, and absolutely loyal not to an idea, but to a person — Kim Il Sung. The Soviet advisors, observing this, could be pleased. Their student had surpassed the teacher.

Chapter 2. The Architecture of Fear: The Modern Structure of the MGB

In the heart of Pyongyang, in a complex of windowless buildings on Chongchun Street, beats the heart of North Korean terror. Here is the headquarters of the Ministry of State Security — an institution whose internal structure is a model of paranoid efficiency. It is not one agency, but a conglomerate of special services under one roof, each responsible for its own area of work in controlling the population.

The central apparatus of the MGB is divided into key directorates, each a mini-empire of fear:

— Investigative Directorate

— Here, methods of conducting interrogations are developed and put into practice. The directorate’s employees are masters of psychological and physical pressure. It is here that “confessions” to espionage and anti-state activities are born. Main tools: sleep deprivation torture, beatings, confinement in ice cells.

— Internal Security Directorate

— Responsible for monitoring the mood of the population and identifying dissent. Directorate employees recruit informants in every residential block, every enterprise, and every institution. Not a single conversation goes unnoticed.

— Government Protection Directorate

— The elite within the elite. Employees of this directorate ensure the physical security of the DPRK’s top leadership. They undergo the most thorough selection and background checks. Their work is a combination of modern technology and old methods of total control.

— Border Guard Directorate

— Controls all sections of the DPRK’s border, including the most fortified sections with China and Russia. Soldiers of the directorate have orders to shoot to kill anyone attempting to cross the border without permission. The patrol system includes not only personnel but also motion sensors, electrified fences, and patrols with dogs.

— Camp Directorate (Correctional Labor Centers)

— Responsible for the system of political camps (kwanliso), where those convicted of political crimes are held. The directorate controls all aspects of life in the camps — from the distribution of food to the fulfillment of production plans using forced labor.

The MGB hierarchy is a pyramid where every brick is cemented by fear and mutual surveillance. At the top is the Minister, personally appointed by and accountable only to the Supreme Leader. His orders descend down the chain, where each level controls the one below and is itself under close observation from above.

Regional MGB structures replicate the country’s administrative divisions:

— Directorates in each province

— Departments in each city and county

— Operational groups in each city block and village

This system ensures total coverage of the territory. An MGB employee in a remote village has the same powers of arrest and interrogation as his capital colleague. Regional directorates conduct their own operational developments and compile dossiers on all residents of their district.

Special departments of the MGB play a particular role:

— Department for Combating Ideological Diversion — tracks any manifestations of foreign influence

— Foreigners Control Department — supervises all foreign guests

— Technical Department — deals with wiretapping and electronic surveillance

— Detention Center No. 15 — a special prison for high-ranking prisoners

The MGB permeates all spheres of life in the DPRK. Its employees work undercover:

— In universities — they monitor the reliability of students and teachers

— In enterprises — they control the political mood of workers

— In cultural institutions — they check the ideological purity of works

— Even in military units — they monitor the army command

The system is built so that every citizen of the DPRK is potentially under MGB surveillance. A neighbor could be an informant, a colleague an agent, and one’s own relative a snitch. This creates an atmosphere of universal paralysis and fear, where even the thought of dissent becomes dangerous.

Chapter 3. The “Ears and Eyes” of the Regime: The System of Total Surveillance and the Informant Network

In 2019, a fisherman K.D.H. from Incheon accidentally picked up a bottle in the sea. Inside, instead of a message, was the diary of a North Korean informant — a few written pages detailing the “suspicious behavior” of residents in the border city of Onsong. The entries included: “May 14, neighbor smoked a South Korean cigarette,” “May 17, family listened to Chinese radio.” Each note was accompanied by the code “No. 217” — the agent’s number in the MGB system.

This diary became material evidence of the work of the “yonbojan” (informants) system — the neural network of total control, where every citizen is simultaneously a victim and a potential executioner. According to defector K., who served in the MGB until 2014, in a typical city block of 300 families, one informant is assigned to every 15—20 households. They are recruited according to the “three generations” scheme — the reliability of the agent’s family is checked back to the third generation.

Recruitment methods are refined to automaticity:

— Blackmail with criminal prosecution of relatives

— Sudden searches with planted prohibited materials

— Ideological pressure through “self-criticism sessions”

A special place is occupied by Pyongyang Institute No. 101 — the forge of personnel for the informant network. Cadets are taught to identify “11 signs of ideological unreliability,” including:

— Wearing clothes out of season (possibility of hiding an escape)

— Excessive politeness (a sign of guilt)

— Accidental use of South Korean slang

The system of punishments for those who refuse to cooperate is described in the UN report (A/HRC/37/CRP.3):

— The family of teacher K. from Hweryong was sent to Camp No. 16 after he refused to inform on colleagues

— In 2017, the entire village council of Chongsong was executed for concealing “unreliable conversations”

In 2021, defector L., a former communications engineer, told the South Korean agency Yonhap about the “Golden Shield” system — an eavesdropping network covering 75% of the DPRK’s territory. In rural areas, listening devices are disguised as rocks and tree stumps; in cities, they are built into street lamps and telephone booths.

The MGB’s technical arsenal:

— Mobile communications: Since 2019, all phones are sold with pre-installed “Surveillance-3” software, which activates the microphone via SMS command. According to the “Committee for Human Rights in North Korea,” in 2022, a case was recorded where a woman from Hamhung was convicted for “anti-state conversations” after her teenage daughter activated the microphone.

— “Voice Hunter” system: An algorithm that analyzes telephone conversations for the presence of 147 “forbidden words.” In 2023, the Japanese newspaper Asahi reported, citing defectors, that an entire neighborhood in Hesan was sent for “re-education” after the system recorded frequent use of the word “hunger.”

— Internet control: The country’s only provider, “Korea Computer Network,” stores the search history of all users. In 2020, an employee of the data processing center Ch. defected to South Korea, bringing with him data on 12,000 “political queries” for which users disappeared.

System failures:

Despite comprehensive control, the system fails. In 2022, a group of 8 people managed to organize an underground communication channel with China using radio parts from Soviet scrap metal. They were betrayed not by an algorithm, but by the 14-year-old son of one of the participants, trained in the “Pioneer Corps” to notice “suspicious activity.”

The Kyo-wang-hyo Effect:

A phenomenon named after a district in Pyongyang where in 2019 residents secretly exchanged South Korean dramas via Bluetooth. The MGB discovered the network only after 11 months, when a technician K. modified the firmware of children’s smartwatches to create a parallel network.

Chapter 4. Kwanliso: The Economy of Repression. How Political Camps Work

In the mountain valleys of South Hamgyong and Yanggang provinces, far from the eyes of the world, lie settlements that are not on the map. Surrounded by rows of electrified barbed wire, watchtowers, and minefields, they form the system of “kwanliso” — political correctional labor camps. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, as of 2023, there are at least 12 such camps operating in North Korea, holding about 80,000–120,000 prisoners.

Camp classification:

— Total Control Camps (No. 14, 15, 16, 25):

— Entry is for life. Prisoners are held with their families according to the principle of “guilt by association” up to three generations. Camp No. 25 in Kaechon is known as the “Invisible Camp” — all prisoners wear masks so as not to recognize each other. According to the testimony of defector L., who escaped from Camp No. 14 in 2018, guards call them “shadows that must disappear without an echo.”

— Revolutionary Zones (No. 3, 7, 9):

— Theoretically provide for “correction through labor.” Prisoners work in coal mines, logging, or chemical production for 16–18 hours a day. The production norm in Camp No. 7 in Taehung-dong is 7 cubic meters of wood per day per person with a ration of 300 grams of corn.

The economy of forced labor:

The camps are an important part of the North Korean economy. According to estimates by the South Korean research institute “Koti,” income from the export of camp products (coal, minerals, textiles) amounts to $150–200 million annually. In 2021, the human rights organization “NK Watch” disclosed contracts between Camp No. 9 and Chinese companies for the supply of graphite and magnetite.

Testimony of K.:

A former guard of Camp No. 16 who defected in 2020 described the punishment system:

— “Tiger cage” — a concrete box 50x50 cm, where prisoners are kept for up to 3 months

— “Standing cell” — a vertical sarcophagus where it is impossible to sit or turn around

— Public executions by hanging or firing squad 2–3 times a year “for educational purposes”

At 5:30 a.m., a siren cuts through the icy air of Camp No. 14. Prisoners, dressed in uniforms soaked with sweat and dirt, line up on the parade ground for roll call. A 10-second delay means loss of rations for a day. A one-minute delay means three days in a “standing cell.” Here, time is measured not in hours, but in grams of corn and centimeters of dug earth.

Daily routine in a total control camp:

— 05:30–06:00 — roll call and “ideological exercise” with slogans

— 06:00–20:00 — work in mines/logging

— 20:00–21:00 — “self-criticism session”

— 21:00–05:30 — sleep in barracks with a temperature of -15°C in winter

Food as a control tool:

The daily ration consists of 300 g of corn porridge, a cup of soup from rotten cabbage, and a glass of salt water. In Camp No. 25, prisoners catch and eat rats — the only source of protein. Guards use food as a reward for informing on other prisoners.

Medical experiments:

Defector P., a former medic in Camp No. 16, testifies:

— Testing of chemical substances on political prisoners

— Forced organ harvesting from those sentenced to execution

— Testing the limits of survival under hunger and cold

Escape cases:

— 2016: Sh. — the first known escape from Total Control Camp No. 14. Overcame 3 rows of electrified fences, bypassing minefields.

— 2021: A group of 7 prisoners from Camp No. 25 attempted to escape through a tunnel. Six were executed, one died during interrogation.

— 2023: A girl from Camp No. 16 hid for 11 days in a cesspool before being found by dogs.

Camp economy:

Camp products are exported to China and African countries. Main items:

— Coal from the mines of Camp No. 9

— Graphite from Camp No. 11

— Timber from Camp No. 7

— Textiles from Camp No. 3

Chapter 5. Censorship as a Weapon: Control over Information, Airwaves, and Art

In 2023, in North Hwanghae Province, a teacher was arrested for possessing a USB flash drive with a South Korean drama. During the search, they found a radio with a modified chip that allowed him to receive foreign frequencies. He was sentenced to 15 years in camp under Article 217 of the DPRK Criminal Code (“dissemination of hostile propaganda”). This is common practice in a country where information control is taken to the absolute.

The DPRK’s state censorship system:

— MGB Radio Control Directorate

— Created in 1972 to suppress “hostile radio voices.” Directorate employees conduct daily raids on homes, checking radios for modifications. In cities, “Grom-M” jammers are used, creating interference on the frequencies of South Korean stations. In 2021, defector K. reported a new method — “radio direction-finding cars” that detect apartments where forbidden broadcasts are listened to.

— Printed Products Analysis Center

— Every book, newspaper, and poster goes through 7 levels of inspection. Particular attention is paid to:

— Mentions of foreign brands

— Photographs with “incorrect” colors (it is believed that dull tones can induce pessimism)

— Accidental hints of economic difficulties

— In 2019, an editor of the newspaper “Rodong Sinmun” was executed for stating in a weather forecast: “today is colder than yesterday” — this was considered a hint at the worsening of life.

— Department for Control of Art and Culture

— All songs, films, and paintings must glorify the ruling dynasty. In 2022, composer P. received 10 years in camp for using “decadent jazz rhythm” in his music. Artist L. was arrested for a painting in which a cloud resembled the South Korean flag.

The fight against foreign media:

Since 2017, the MGB has introduced the “Red Shield” system — scanners that detect electronic devices at checkpoints. In 2023, South Korean intelligence reported a new smuggling method — burying waterproof containers with flash drives in border areas.

Continuing…

In 2024, in Pyongyang, engineer K. was arrested for creating an underground Wi-Fi network using old routers. The network worked for only 11 days, but during that time it managed to transfer 47 GB of data, including translations of BBC articles and excerpts from South Korean dramas. His execution was broadcast on a closed channel for MGB employees as an “instructive lesson.”

Modern methods of digital control:

— National intranet network “Kwangmyong”

— A tightly controlled internal network, access to which is available to only 3% of the population. Every request passes through 7 levels of filtering. In 2023, system administrator P. was arrested for attempting to create a “shadow channel” for data transmission through Pyongyang University servers.

— Mobile control

— All phones in the DPRK are sold with pre-installed “Surveillance-3” software, which:

— Blocks attempts to record video

— Automatically deletes files with certain keywords

— Transmits geolocation to the MGB every 30 minutes

— Cyber patrols

— Created in 2018, “cyber squads” of 5,000 employees monitor activity on the intranet. In 2024, student K. received 15 years in camp for attempting to create a chat bot to bypass censorship.

Resistance and new methods of information dissemination:

— “Balloon propaganda” — activists from South Korea and human rights defenders launch balloons with USB drives and leaflets

— “Underground cinemas” — screenings of foreign films are organized in basements in border areas

— “Digital guerrillas” — technical intelligentsia creates temporary networks using outdated equipment

The black market effect:

Despite harsh punishments, a thriving black market for information exists in the DPRK. Prices for smuggled devices (2024):

— Chinese smartphone with internet access: $1500

— Satellite phone: $4000

South Korean drama on a flash drive: $30

Chapter 6. The Ideological Inquisitors: The Fight Against “Incorrect” Thoughts and Religion

In 2023, in South Hamgyong Province, a school teacher was arrested for “propagating alternative historical interpretations” — during a lesson, he mentioned that Chinese volunteers participated in the Korean War. His family disappeared into Camp No. 13. This case illustrates the main principle: any deviation from the official doctrine is considered a state crime.

Structure of Ideological Control:

— Department 2—9 of the MGB (“Ideological Purity”)

— Created in 1975 to combat “incorrect thoughts.” Department employees:

— Infiltrate educational institutions posing as teachers

— Recruit informants among schoolchildren

— Conduct surprise checks of personal diaries

— Psychological Profiling Center

— Develops methods for identifying “hidden dissent”:

— Handwriting analysis for “suspicious slants”

— Association tests using 150 control words

— Monitoring facial expressions during the singing of patriotic songs

Religion as a Threat to the Regime:

All religious associations are under the strict control of the MGB. In 2024, an underground Christian circle was uncovered in Chondin:

— 27 participants were sentenced to life imprisonment

— The community leader was publicly executed

— The children of the participants were sent to Orphanage No. 7 (“correction through labor”)

Operational Methods:

— “Social X-ray” — studying biographies back to the third generation

— “Ideological traps” — provocateurs in internet cafes

— “Preventive arrests” — detentions on suspicion of “potential unreliability”

In 2024, in the city of Hamhung, an underground network distributing Christian literature through hollow metal parts in trains was uncovered. The network’s leader — former MGB officer K. — used his knowledge of surveillance systems to create “blind spots” at train stations. His capture took the authorities 11 months and required the infiltration of an agent into the railway workers’ environment.

Modern Methods of Religious Resistance:

— “Invisible Bibles” — texts written in sympathetic ink on official newspapers

— Underground seminars in mountainous areas with an alert system using fishing nets

— Digital sermons via modified walkie-talkies

New MGB Control Technologies:

— “Voice Analysis-4” System

— An AI algorithm that detects micro-fluctuations in the voice indicating “hidden doubt” when reciting loyalty oaths. In 2023, it was used to identify 147 “unreliable” employees in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

— Neuromonitoring in Universities

— Students at leading universities undergo mandatory EEG testing while viewing portraits of the leaders. Suspicious brain activity in areas associated with critical thinking becomes grounds for expulsion.

— “Social Rating” Program

— Introduced in 2022 in Pyongyang. Citizens earn points for:

— Participation in ideological events

— Informing on neighbors

— Public confessions

— A low rating means:

— Ban on living in the capital

— Denial of access to food distribution centers

— Forced employment in hazardous industries

The Nampo Incident (2024):

A worker at the shipbuilding plant Ch. was arrested after a surveillance camera recorded “insufficiently fast” movement of his lips while singing a patriotic anthem. During a search, a manuscript analyzing the DPRK’s economic problems compared to China was found. The public execution was broadcast on the factory radio.

Chapter 7. Investigation and Interrogation: Methods of Extracting Confessions and Psychological Pressure

In 2023, Professor of History K. died in MGB Detention Center No. 5 in Pyongyang. According to a report by the South Korean organization “North Korean Defectors,” his body showed signs of 27 different types of torture, including bone fractures, burns, and damage to internal organs. The official cause of death was “cardiac arrest.” This case illustrates the standard practice of the MGB investigative bodies, where a confession is considered the “queen of evidence,” regardless of the methods used to obtain it.

The MGB Detention Center System:

— Detention Center No. 1 (“Special Facility”)

— Located in an underground bunker beneath the MGB building in Pyongyang. Designed for high-ranking prisoners. Cells are equipped with constant video surveillance and vital signs sensors.

— Detention Center No. 3 (“Re-education Block”)

— Specializes in “ideological criminals.” Methods of psychological processing are applied:

— Sensory deprivation

— Constant exposure to loud patriotic songs

— Sleep deprivation

— Detention Center No. 7 (“Labor Zone”)

— For mass criminals. Prisoners are held in cells with 30—40 people, with a norm of 5—7.

Physical Interrogation Methods:

— “Steel Hoop”

— A special device that compresses the prisoner’s head. The intensity of pressure is regulated depending on the stage of the interrogation.

— “Dollhouse”

— A cell measuring 50×50×150 cm, where the prisoner can only stand. Duration of confinement — up to 30 days.

— “Air Solitary Confinement”

— Suspending the prisoner by their hands, crossed behind their back. Standard time — 6—8 hours.

— Water Tortures

— Use of ice water or forced ingestion of large volumes of water into the stomach.

Pharmacological Methods:

Use of psychotropic drugs for:

— Weakening the will

— Inducing disorientation

— Creating suggestibility

In 2024, at MGB Detention Center No. 4 in Hamhung, a case was recorded where prisoner K. was forced to sign interrogation protocols that he could not read — his eyes were damaged as a result of torture with bright light. This reflects the MGB’s systemic approach to obtaining confessions at any cost.

Psychological Influence Methods:

— “Personality Destruction Technique”

— Multi-day interrogations with constant rotation of investigators

— Systematic sleep deprivation and disruption of circadian rhythms

— Forced observation of other prisoners being tortured

— “False Hope Method”

— Investigators create the illusion of possible release in exchange for a confession. Prisoners are promised:

— Meetings with relatives

— Improved conditions

— Mitigation of the sentence

— “Good Cop/Bad Cop”

— A classic tactic adapted by the North Korean authorities:

— The “bad cop” applies physical violence

— The “good cop” offers protection and understanding

The System of Forced Confessions:

— Stage 1: “Initial Resistance”

— Physical pressure to break the will

— Threats against the prisoner’s family

— Deprivation of food and water

— Stage 2: “Protocol Formation”

— Investigators dictate the text of the confession

— The prisoner must memorize all details

— Repeated rewriting of the protocol

— Stage 3: “Automation of Confession”

— The prisoner must repeat the confession on camera

— Discussion of fictional details of the “crime”

— Signing the final version of the protocol

Use of Technology in Interrogations:

— Latest generation lie detectors

— Analysis of micro-expressions

— Monitoring of brain activity

— Thermographic scanning

— Software for Testimony Analysis

— Identifying contradictions in the story

— Comparison with databases of other confessions

— Generating questions for further interrogation

The Case of L. (2023):

A former DPRK trade representative in China was interrogated for 78 days. Investigators used a combination of sensory deprivation and pharmacological means. As a result, he signed a confession to espionage, although a later medical examination showed he could not have acted consciously.

Chapter 8. Border Defense: Control of Internal Movement and Prevention of Escapes

In 2023, 24-year-old K. was shot dead while attempting to cross the Tumen River. A letter to his sister, who had escaped to South Korea a year earlier, was found in his pocket: “I must hear your voice at least once.” This incident reflects the harsh reality: the DPRK’s border is one of the most heavily guarded in the world, and the internal movement of citizens is strictly controlled.

Border Control System:

— North Korean-Chinese Border

— Length 1420 km. Equipped with:

— Double row of electrified fences

— Motion sensors every 50 meters

— Patrol towers with snipers

— Minefields in the border zone

— Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)

— With the South Korean side:

— 4 km wide exclusion zone

— Hourly patrols

— Automatic machine gun installations

Internal Pass System:

Moving between provinces requires a special MGB permit — “Pass Form No. 12.” Obtaining it includes:

— Background check to the third generation

— Approval from the local MGB office

— Indication of the exact reason for the trip

Control Technologies:

— “Vostok-3” System

— A network of surveillance cameras with AI facial recognition at all checkpoints

— Mobile Checkpoints

— Sudden document checks on trains and highways

— Electronic Passes

— Introduced in 2023 for Pyongyang residents. Contain:

— Biometric data

— Travel history

— Social rating

Border Patrol:

Service is carried out by three categories of military personnel:

— Regular border troops

— MGB special units

— Mobile reserve groups

In 2024, a mass escape attempt through a tunnel dug under the border with China was thwarted. A group of 12 people, including a former MGB employee, used homemade tools and a ventilation system assembled from car parts. The tunnel was detected by the “Strazh-2” seismic monitoring system after 6 months of work.

Modern Escape Methods:

— Sea Routes

— Use of inflatable boats with silent electric motors

— Disguise as fishing vessels

— Navigation using satellite images printed on waterproof paper

— Aerial Attempts

— Homemade hang gliders made of bamboo and polyethylene

— Use of weather conditions to cross the border

— Tunnels

— Creating tunnels from abandoned mines

— Lighting systems using stolen batteries

— Secret hatches in residential buildings in border cities

MGB Countermeasures:

— Technical Means

— Infrared cameras with a 5 km range

— Acoustic sensors for detecting tunnels

— UAVs with night vision thermal imagers

— Rapid Response Tactical Groups

— Mounted patrols in mountainous areas

— Mobile groups in off-road vehicles

— Special units on speedboats

Punishments for Escape Attempts:

— For Those Caught

— Public execution by hanging

— Life imprisonment in strict regime camps

— Forced medical experiments

— For the Families of Escapees

— Arrest of all relatives to the third generation

— Confiscation of property

— Placement of children in special orphanages

Escape Statistics (2020—2024):

— Successful escapes: 87 people

— Thwarted attempts: 214 cases

— Caught during a repeat attempt: 12 people

— Executed for assisting in organizing escapes: 34 people

Chapter 9. The Kims’ Personal Guard: Special Units for Protecting the First Family

In 2023, an officer of Kim Jong Un’s guard, L., prevented an assassination attempt by discovering a microphone device in the leader’s car. The device was disguised as a bolt in the car’s undercarriage and had an autonomous power source. This is just one example of the daily work of a unit whose vigilance knows no breaks.

Structure of the Personal Guard:

— Protection Bureau No. 1 (Pyongyang)

— Responsible for the security of Kim Jong Un and his family. Consists of 3000 employees selected according to the strictest criteria:

— Background check of 8 generations of relatives

— Ideological loyalty confirmed by polygraph

— Physical endurance (standard: 15-km forced march in 45 minutes)

— Special Unit “Falcon”

— Elite bodyguards trained under a unique program:

— Sniper shooting at distances up to 1500 meters

— Specialization in close quarters combat

— Skills in detecting and neutralizing modern surveillance devices

— Female Guard “Flower”

— Consists of 200 women responsible for the security of the women of the ruling dynasty. Special requirements:

— Proficiency in martial arts (taekwondo, hapkido)

— Knowledge of etiquette and protocol

— Medical training

Residence Security System:

— Residence “Bastion” (Kim Jong Un’s main headquarters)

— Multi-level system of underground bunkers up to 100 meters deep

— Autonomous life support systems

— Own communication network independent of national infrastructure

— Summer Residence “Wave”

— System of hydroacoustic sensors in coastal waters

— Anti-sabotage nets

— Mobile anti-aircraft missile systems

Transport Security:

— Motorcades

— Use of doubles and ghost cars

— Electronic warfare systems

— Instant evacuation in armored capsules

— Railway Trains

— 12 identical trains running on different routes

— Daily track inspection by special robots

— Own tunnels not used by civilian trains

In 2024, during Kim Jong Un’s visit to a plant in Hungnam, the “Molot-7” emergency alert system was triggered. Within 12 seconds, bodyguards formed a human shield, evacuated the leader to an armored car, and secured the perimeter. The investigation showed a false alarm, but the guards’ reaction demonstrates the well-oiled nature of the security mechanisms.

Emergency Protocols:

— Assassination Threat

— Immediate evacuation to the nearest protected structure

— Activation of the “Tuman” system — dispersion of masking aerosols

— Blocking all communication channels within a 1 km radius

— Aerial Threat

— Launch of mobile “Pongae-2” air defense systems

— Use of laser dazzling systems

— Evacuation by helicopter with an armored cabin

— Civil Unrest

— Use of ultrasonic devices to disperse crowds

— Creation of evacuation corridors using armored vehicles

Special Training:

— Psychological Selection

— Testing for resistance to torture

— Checking reactions to stressful situations

— Analysis of the ability to make decisions under uncertainty

— Physical Training

— Daily standards:

— 10 km run with a 30 kg load

— 50 meter underwater swim

— Completing an obstacle course in 3 minutes

— Tactical Training

— Practicing scenarios of attacks by kamikaze drones

— Defense against cyberattacks on security systems

— Countering modern sniper systems

Technical Equipment:

— Individual Equipment

— Body armor of protection class 6

— 4th generation night vision goggles

— Portable detectors of chemical and radiological threats

— Special Equipment

— Inspector robots for route checks

— Anti-drone rifles

— Portable X-ray machines

Redundancy System:

All key security functions are duplicated:

— Independent communication lines

— Backup power generators

— Alternative evacuation routes

Chapter 10. The MGB Abroad: Controlling Diplomats and Eliminating Dissenters Overseas

In October 2023, a North Korean diplomatic courier, K., was detained in London while attempting to pass a flash drive with data on British air defense systems to a Russian military intelligence officer. During a search, a hidden camera in a lighter and a cipher notebook with one-time use codes were found on him. This incident revealed only the tip of the iceberg of MGB activities outside North Korea — a multi-layered system of espionage, control, and intimidation that entangles all of the country’s foreign missions.

Structure of Foreign MGB Operations:

— Residencies under Diplomatic Cover

— Every DPRK embassy and consulate is a legal MGB residency. Standard staff includes:

— The Resident (usually undercover as a counselor or deputy ambassador)

— Operational officers (second secretaries, attachés)

— Technical intelligence specialists (radio operators, lock pickers)

— Agents of influence among local politicians and businessmen

— Illegal Apparatuses

— Created through front companies in third countries. For example, in 2022, a network of 12 agents was exposed in Singapore, operating under the guise of employees of the fishing company “Ocean-7,” engaged in intercepting communications in the Strait of Malacca.

Methods of Controlling the Diplomatic Corps:

— “Triad” System

— Each embassy employee is accompanied by two MGB employees, who monitor each other and the diplomat. This creates a closed circle of mutual surveillance, eliminating the possibility of recruitment or defection.

— Electronic Monitoring

— All official and residential premises of foreign missions are equipped with the “Oko-3” system, including:

— Listening devices in ventilation and electrical sockets

— Motion sensors with behavior analysis

— Daily checks of personal devices for unauthorized contacts

— Ideological Control

— Mandatory weekly “self-criticism sessions,” where diplomats must publicly analyze their “mistakes and ideological deviations.” The minutes of these meetings are sent to the Center in Pyongyang.

Operations to Eliminate Dissenters:

— Special Group “Kwangmu”

— Mobile teams of liquidators operating in Europe and Asia. Their methods include:

— Injections of nerve-paralytic agents

— Staging accidents

— Use of radioactive substances

— “Proxy” Technique

— Creating situations where the elimination of the target is carried out by third parties. In 2021, a member of the South Korean mafia was arrested in Seoul, having received $500,000 for organizing an “accident” involving defector P..

In February 2024, German counterintelligence recorded an attempt to introduce the “Songun-7” Trojan program into the Bundestag’s computer network. The attack was linked to the DPRK diplomatic mission in Berlin and used a social engineering method through a fake letter in the name of a deputy. This case demonstrates the technical capability of the MGB’s overseas apparatus, which spends up to 40% of its budget on cyber espionage.

Modern Information Gathering Technologies:

— Cyber Espionage

— The special unit “Bureau 121” uses:

— Targeted phishing attacks on government institutions

— Infiltration of software supply chains

— Data theft through IoT device vulnerabilities

— Technical Intelligence

— Laser microphones for picking up vibrations from window panes

— Portable skimmers for contactless copying of RFID passports

— Modified routers for intercepting traffic in public networks

Methods of Recruiting Foreigners:

— Blackmail and Kompromat

— Classic methods supplemented by digital technologies:

— Creating deepfakes with compromising materials

— Hacking darknet accounts to obtain data on illegal activities

— Analyzing social media publications for vulnerabilities

— Financial Schemes

— Offering contracts with front companies

— Payment via cryptocurrencies using mixers

— Creating fake debt obligations for subsequent blackmail

Counterintelligence Operations:

— Identifying Recruitment Approaches

— The MGB trains its employees to identify standard methods of Western intelligence agencies:

— Analysis of profiles in professional networks

— Monitoring of non-standard acquaintances through dating apps

— Identification of fake job offers

— Disinformation Campaigns

— Creating fake news portals in the languages of target countries

— Using bot networks to influence public opinion

— Compromising foreign politicians through fake NGOs

Specifics of Work in Different Regions:

— In China and Russia

— Emphasis on obtaining military technologies

— Recruiting students from technical universities

— Creating joint ventures for access to classified information

— In EU Countries

— Using humanitarian organizations as cover

— Targeted work with mid-level officials

— Exploiting the migration crisis for recruitment

— In Southeast Asia

— Creating criminal networks for money laundering

— Recruitment through casinos and the gambling business

Using tourist companies for illegal operations

Chapter 11. MGB Defectors: Stories of Those Who Built the System and Escaped It

In May 2023, former MGB Colonel K., who spent 20 years in the state security apparatus, swam across the border river Tumen with a briefcase containing 400 gigabytes of secret documents. “When I last looked back at the shore where my family remained, I understood I was walking towards certain death, but it was no longer possible to live in that machine of suppression,” he later told the South Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo.

His escape was one of the most high-profile in the last decade, but far from the only one. Since 2010, at least 47 MGB employees of various ranks have defected to South Korea, each bringing fragments of the monstrous mosaic of the North Korean total control system.

The Story of L.: From Recruiter to Dissident

L., who worked in the MGB’s 5th Directorate recruiting foreigners, defected in 2018 via the Chinese border. In an interview with BBC Korea, he described the operative training system: “We were taught that nothing is sacred — not friendship, not family, not love. Only the mission. I recruited Chinese businessmen by blackmailing them with connections to prostitutes, I drugged Japanese diplomats to then ‘help’ them and obtain kompromat.”

The turning point came when he was ordered to arrange the disappearance of a North Korean woman who had married a Chinese businessman and began criticizing the regime in private conversations. “Her ten-year-old daughter looked at me with glassy eyes when we took her mother away. Those eyes haunted me every night.”

The Escape of K.: Testimony from Inside the Camp System

K., a former chief of security at Camp No. 16, made an unprecedented escape in 2020, taking with him documentation on 1,200 prisoners. “In the camp, there was an old man serving a sentence since 1972 for accidentally stepping on a newspaper with a photo of Kim Il Sung. His story was the last straw,” he said.

The documents Kim brought out contained detailed descriptions of medical experiments on political prisoners, including tests of new psychotropic drugs and studies on the limits of human survival at extreme temperatures. “The guards called the prisoners ‘consumable materials’, ” K. recalls with a shudder. “The system destroyed everything human in them, starting with their names.”

“When I reached the South Korean consulate in Shenyang, I had no teeth or nails left — only a folder of documents and a desperate hope,” are the words of K., a former analyst for the MGB’s foreign intelligence. His escape across the Chinese border took 47 days and cost the lives of three helpers.

The Escape Chain: How MGB Employees Disappear

An escape plan usually matures over months. K. described this process: “First, you notice an internal tremor when writing reports on torture. Then you start having nightmares. Then comes the cold realization: it’s either me or them.”

Most defectors go through three stages:

— Stage of Internal Resistance — working “on two fronts,” creating secret archives.

— Stage of Finding Channels — establishing contacts with foreign intelligence agencies via third countries.

— Stage of Disappearance — developing a cover story, destroying traces.

MGB Countermeasures: The Hunt for Defectors

According to a 2023 UN report, the MGB maintains a special unit “Kumgang-217,” whose task is the “neutralization of traitors.” Methods are refined to automaticity:

— In South Korea: Abductions, cyberattacks, blackmail of relatives.

— In China: Close cooperation with local security organs.

— In Europe: Use of organized crime.

“A bounty of $500,000 has been placed on my head,” reported former MGB Colonel P. in 2023. “There were two attempts on my life: in Seoul and in Warsaw.”

The Fate of Families: Hostages of the System

The story of L., who defected in 2021, is tragically typical: “My wife and two children were sent to Camp No. 17. The last letter from my wife came after six months — forwarded by a Chinese trader. She wrote that our son died of dystrophy, and our daughter works at a logging site.”

In total, there were 94 cases of reprisals against families of MGB defectors just between 2022 and 2024.

Information Value

Each defector is a treasure trove of information. K., whose escape was mentioned in the first part, brought data on:

— The system of cyber espionage against South Korean banks.

— Methods of recruiting Japanese politicians.

— Sanctions evasion schemes through front companies.

“These people are living witnesses to crimes against humanity,” stated a representative of South Korean intelligence. “Their testimony is invaluable to the international community.”

Chapter 12. Internal Security Failures: Uprisings, Incidents, and Information Leaks

“We thought we controlled every square meter of territory, but the underground world lived by its own rules.” These words, spoken by former head of the Hamhung MGB office Kyu in 2023, refer to an incident that shook the DPRK’s security system in 2022 — mass riots in Camp No. 13.

The Hamhung Uprising: When Despair Became Stronger Than Fear

In March 2022, prisoners of Camp No. 13 in South Hamgyong rebelled, seizing an armory and taking 15 guards hostage. The uprising lasted 11 hours and was suppressed using helicopters and chemical weapons.

“They weren’t demanding freedom — they demanded food and an end to torture,” recounted defector L., a former camp guard. “When the helicopters arrived, people stood with raised hands, holding empty bowls.”

The Nuclear Program Leak: How Secrets Disappeared

In 2021, one of the most serious information leaks occurred — an engineer from the nuclear center in Yongbyon, K., copied and smuggled out technical documentation on new centrifuges. According to an IAEA report, it was the “most significant data leak on the North Korean nuclear program in the last decade.”

“He used a method we were taught in the MGB — dead letter drops and steganography,” confessed former counterintelligence officer P..

The Cyber Escape: When Technology Turned Against the System

In 2023, a group of IT specialists from the MGB’s cybersecurity unit made an unprecedented escape, taking out 12 terabytes of data, including:

— Archives of wiretapped foreign diplomats.

— Plans for cyber attacks on US financial systems.

— Databases of informants abroad.

— “They weren’t just techies — they knew all the vulnerabilities of the security system,” reported a source.

“We built a perfect prison but forgot that the jailers are human too.” This admission by former deputy head of the camp management K. in 2024 reveals the fundamental weakness of the MGB system — the human factor, which continues to undermine the seemingly unshakable mechanism.

Crisis in the Elite: When Loyalty Cracked

In 2023, a scandal erupted that shook the highest echelons of power. MGB Colonel O., responsible for decades for the security of the ruling family, was arrested on suspicion of passing information to Chinese intelligence. The investigation uncovered a network of 14 high-ranking officers linked to the case.

“O. wasn’t just a traitor — he was the keeper of the dynasty’s darkest secrets,” an anonymous source reported. “His arrest caused panic in the highest circles.”

The “Shadows” Uprising: Revolt in Camp No. 7

In October 2023, the longest uprising in the history of the North Korean penal system erupted in Camp No. 7. Prisoners, whom guards called “shadows,” took control of the “Kumgang” mine and held it for six days.

“They used homemade explosives and knowledge of the mine’s ventilation system,” said defector L., a former camp guard. “The most shocking thing — they managed to establish contact with the outside world via a smuggled satellite phone.”

Technological Fiasco: How the Surveillance System Turned Against the Watchers

In 2024, it was revealed that the AI systems implemented by the MGB for population monitoring contained a critical vulnerability. A group of IT specialists managed to embed “sleeper codes” into the algorithms that distorted data on population sentiment.

“For eight months, the system showed that population loyalty was 98%, while the real figures had fallen to 67%,” reported technical specialist K., who defected to South Korea.

Consequences and Purges

Every failure leads to large-scale purges:

— After the Hamhung uprising, 23 MGB employees were executed.

— The nuclear secrets leak led to 156 arrests.

— The cyber escape caused a reorganization of the entire IT unit.

“The system devours its own children,” said former MGB analyst Ch.. “Every failure is not just someone’s death, it’s another nail in the coffin of the entire regime.”

Chapter 13. Control Technologies: From Old Methods to Cyber Surveillance

“In the 90s, we listened to telephone conversations through relay stations. Today, the algorithm itself flags suspicious dialogues, and drones monitor every step.” This admission by a former engineer of the MGB Technical Department K. in 2024 reflects the technological evolution of the control system, where old methods of manual oversight have merged with a digital all-seeing eye.

The Evolution of Eavesdropping Systems: From Copper Wires to Neural Networks

The history of the MGB’s technical equipment is a path from primitive devices to complex cyber systems:

— 1970s-1980s: Manual wiretapping of telephone lines through switchboards. Hundreds of operators in basement rooms recorded up to 3,000 conversations per day.

— 1990s: Introduction of the “Golos-3” automatic recording systems, capable of processing up to 10,000 communication channels simultaneously.

— 2010s: The “Vseukho” (All-Ear) system with voice recognition function, recording up to 50,000 keywords in real time.

— 2020s: The “Strazh-7” (Guardian-7) neural network, analyzing not only words but also intonation, pauses, and emotional tone of speech.

Video Surveillance System: From Cameras to Facial Recognition

In 2023, defector P. brought to Seoul documentation on the “Vsevidyashchee Oko” (All-Seeing Eye) system — a network of 450,000 surveillance cameras across the country, capable of identifying a person in a crowd with 99.7% accuracy.

“The ‘behavior prediction’ function especially amazed me,” P. said at a press conference. “The algorithm analyzes gait, gestures, and movement routes, identifying potential ‘unreliables’ before they commit anything illegal.”

Internet Control: The National Intranet “Kwangmyong”

Created in 2000 as the North Korean internet analogue, the “Kwangmyong” network is a fully controlled digital space:

— All requests pass through 7 levels of filtering.

— Each user is assigned a “digital reliability rating.”

— Algorithms track time spent on each website and click patterns.

— In 2022, student K. received 15 years in a camp for attempting to create a VPN connection through university servers.

“When I first saw the ‘Social Rating’ system in action, I understood: we had created a digital god that punishes for sins a person hasn’t even thought of yet.” This statement by L., a former programmer of the MGB Technical Department in 2024, reveals the essence of the new era of digital control in the DPRK.

Biometric Passports and the “Digital Twin” System

Since 2023, all DPRK citizens are required to have biometric ID cards with embedded chips containing:

— Voice samples and DNA profile.

— Geolocation data for the last 5 years.

— Search history in the “Kwangmyong” intranet.

— Social rating scores and political reliability indicators.

— “The system creates a ‘digital twin’ of every citizen,” explained L. “This twin lives in virtual space and allows predicting a person’s behavior with up to 91% accuracy.”

The “Preventor-MK” Prediction System

Introduced in 2022, the system uses artificial intelligence to identify potential dissidents before they show any activity. The algorithm analyzes:

— Micro-expressions during political events.

— Information consumption patterns.

— Social connections and frequency of contacts.

— Even physiological indicators from wearable devices.

— “In 2023, ‘Preventor-MK’ identified 147 ‘potentially unreliable’ citizens in Hamhung,” reported defector K. “They were all placed under preventive surveillance, and three were sent to camps for ‘ideological correction’.”

Mobile Control: The “Loyalty” App

Since 2023, all smartphone owners in the DPRK are required to install the “Loyalty” app, which:

— Takes screenshots hourly.

— Analyzes voice conversations through the microphone.

— Monitors correspondence in messengers.

— Automatically blocks “improper” content.

— “The app became a digital overseer in every pocket,” stated technical specialist P., who defected in 2024. “It even measures heart rate while watching political news.”

The “Cyber-Inquisitor” System

A neural network introduced in 2024, capable of:

— Analyzing handwritten texts for hidden symbolism.

— Identifying “ideologically harmful” patterns in creative works.

— Predicting the spread of “incorrect” ideas.

— “When the system detects a potential threat, it automatically sends ‘cyber-inquisitors’ — special MGB agents trained to work with digital criminals,” said K., a former cyber department employee.

Chapter 14. The MGB and the Elite: Relations with the Party and the Army

“We watched the generals as closely as we watched state enemies — perhaps even more closely.” This admission by former head of the MGB’s 3rd Directorate K. in an interview with Asahi Shimbun in 2024 reveals the essence of the complex relationship between the state security organs, the party nomenclature, and the military elite of the DPRK — relationships built on mutual fear and total surveillance.

Surveillance of the Party Elite: The Invisible Chain

According to documents provided by defector L. in 2023, each member of the WPK Politburo is assigned an MGB operative whose task is daily observation and psychological profiling. Methods include:

— Wiretapping of official and personal premises.

— Monitoring correspondence and financial transactions.

— Recruiting servants as informants.

— Analyzing behavior during family events.

— “Special attention is paid to the children of high-ranking officials,” reported L. “The MGB creates a dossier on every elite offspring from birth.”

The System of “Mutual Deterrence”: A Web of Kompromat

In 2022, a scandal erupted when Deputy Minister of Armed Forces Ch. was arrested on corruption charges. The investigation revealed that the MGB had been collecting kompromat on him for decades, including:

— Recordings of secret meetings with Chinese businessmen.